This paper studies a non-concave optimization problem under a Value-at-Risk (VaR) or an Expected Shortfall (ES) constraint. The non-concavity of the problem stems from the non-linear payoff structure of the optimizing investor. We obtain the closed-form optimal wealth with an ES constraint as well as with a VaR constraint respectively, and explicitly calculate the optimal trading strategy for a CRRA (i.e., constant relative risk aversion) utility function. In our non-concave optimization problem, we find that for any VaR-constraint with an arbitrary risk level, there exists an ES-constraint leading to the same investment strategy, assuming that the regulation only protects the debt holders' benefit to a certain level. This differs from the conclusion drawn in Basak and Shapiro [2001] for the concave optimization problem, where VaR and ES lead to different solutions.
Introduction
The standard risk measure used as regulatory and risk management tool by financial institutions is Value-at-Risk (VaR). VaR describes the loss that is exceeded under a given probability within a given horizon, see Duffie and Pan [1997] . There has been lots of discussion in the literature about the suitability of VaR as a risk measure for regulatory purposes, see for instance Artzner et al. [1999] , Rockafellar and Uryasev [2000] , Cuoco and Liu [2006] and Danielsson et al. [2001] . Opponents criticize that VaR lacks the sub-additivity that an appropriate risk measure should have and furthermore only considers the probability but not the magnitude of a loss. However, VaR is the cornerstone of the Basel III and Solvency II capital requirements and is widely used in practice. On the other hand, Expected Shortfall, which has various different versions such as Tail-Value-at-Risk (TVaR), Worst-Case-Value-at-Risk (WVaR) or Average-Value-at-Risk (AVaR), is seen as an alternative of VaR. Expected Shortfall is the expectation of the losses which are above a certain level. Some of its versions have also found their way into regulatory practice and are for instance used by the Swiss Solvency Test, see also the discussion in Acerbi and Tasche [2002b] and Embrechts et al. [2014] . Furthermore, in a consultative document on the third Basel accord, the committee explicitly raised the prospect of phasing out VaR and replacing it with Expected Shortfall, see Chen [2014] .
The debate about whether VaR should be replaced by an Expected Shortfall-like risk measure is still ongoing. One stream of the discussion focuses on the axiomatic properties of VaR or ES as a risk measure. Acerbi et al. [2001] and Acerbi and Tasche [2002a] study the general definitions of AVaR and TVaR showing that these risk measures are essentially coherent and therefore support them as a better risk measure over VaR. Another stream of the discussion focuses on the statistical properties of VaR, where it is well known that Expected Shortfall-like risk measures are notoriously sensitive to outliers and hence lack robustness, see Cont et al. [2010] and Kou et al. [2013] . Furthermore, VaR, contrary to its alternatives, is elicitable, see for instance Ziegel [2016] . For other related papers on statistical properties of VaR and ES we also recommend Bernard et al. [2014] , Ghaoui et al. [2003] , Du and Escanciano [2016] , Lan et al. [2010] and Embrechts et al. [2013] . In a recent work, Embrechts et al. [2015] show that AVaR is more robust with respect to dependence uncertainty compared to VaR.
Except for being used for regulatory purposes, VaR and ES are also widely employed as an (internal) risk management tool. For instance, VaR and ES can be applied as risk control constraints for portfolio selection. In this context in a seminal paper, Basak and Shapiro [2001] investigate the risk management problem of a concave utility maximizer with an additional VaR or ES constraint. They conclude that the VaR-based risk management will induce more severe losses than the ES-based risk management in the worst financial states and therefore advocate ES as an alternative and better risk measure. Shi and Werker [2012] use numerical methods to verify that the difference between the VaR and ES-strategy in the worst financial states will be reduced significantly if the risk constraint is re-evaluated multiple times before the investment horizon. Cuoco et al. [2008] compute VaR and ES dynamically in continuous time, assuming that the portfolio weights are unchanged for the time interval over which the regulatory capital is computed, and show that VaR and ES will induce the same optimal strategy in this case. He et al. [2015] study the dynamic portfolio choice problem under a newly defined weighted-VaR (WVaR) risk measure incorporating VaR and ES as special cases. Further, Wei [2018] considers the utility maximization problem under WVaR. They both conclude that WVaR induces more risky trading behaviours compared to the optimal strategy without constraints.
The previous conclusions apply to the standard concave optimization problem. This paper intends to study the effect of a VaR-or an ES-constraint in a non-concave environment. We consider the optimal asset allocation problem of a financial institution acting on behalf of its equity holders, under a regulatory VaR-or ES-constraint. This problem can be presented as a constrained non-concave utility maximization problem. The payoff structure of the equity holders is non-linear and will cause the non-concavity of the portfolio selection problem, which is a well-known fact and has been studied by several researchers, see Nguyen and Stadje [2020] , Dong et al. [2019] and Chen et al. [2019] . We intend to highlight the effect of the VaR-or the ES-constraint in such a context and hence only consider the simplest non-linear payoff to the equity holders. However, our model is sufficiently general and can be extended to more complex non-linear payoffs. We assume that the regulatory horizon is the same as the investment horizon, which makes our model the counterpart model of Basak and Shapiro [2001] but in a non-concave optimization environment. The unconstrained non-concave optimization problem has already been studied, see for instance Carpenter [2000] , Kouwenberg and Ziemba [2007] and Reichlin [2011] . However, the non-concave optimization with an additional constraint, especially with an ES-constraint has not yet received a complete treatment. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first one to deal with an ES-constrained non-concave optimization problem. Note that Nguyen and Stadje [2020] solve the VaR-constrained non-concave optimization in which the regulatory threshold is set equal to the liability level. Our problem with a VaR-constraint includes the situation where the regulatory threshold is freely chosen.
The non-concavity of the problem stems from distinguishing equity and debt in the asset structure, and from the standard assumption that the financial institution maximizes the utility on behalf of the equity holders. The debt level, which is also the strike price of the option-payoff to the equity holders, plays a significant role in determining the structure of the optimal solution. Using a static Lagrangian technique and the martingale approach, we obtain explicit optimal solutions to the terminal wealth and the investment strategy. We find that the optimal solution in such a non-concave problem always has a region of holding "nothing", henceforth referred to as the "nothing"-region. The reason is that the considered option-type payoff is out of money in bad financial states. Therefore, the financial institution is motivated to reallocate its capital, and invest more in the states where the option is in the money in order to gain more potential upward benefits. Any holding in the region where the option is out of money does not benefit the equity holders and only serves to satisfy the regulatory constraint.
Usually, the regulation only aims at protecting the debt holders to a certain level, i.e., L ≤ D T , where D T is the debt amount at time T , and L is the threshold up to which the regulator aims to protect the debt holders. In such situations we find that due to the nonlinearity of the payoff structure, a VaR-and an ES-constraint in fact lead to the same optimal strategy. Because of the existence of the "nothing" region, the worst financial states in an ESsolution are only determined by the risk constraint, and then there exists a strategy such that the two constraints are mutually replaceable. Furthermore, due to the equivalence, one (either VaR or ES) constraint can control the probability of the severe loss and the magnitude of the expected loss at the same time. However, if L > D T , the equivalence result does not hold. Note that the worst financial states in an ES-constrained solution when L > D T depend additionally on the risk preference of the company and the initial wealth level, which renders the equivalence result invalid. We provide the explicit optimal investment strategies considering a CRRA utility function. We find that risk constraints restrict the financial institution's risky behaviour. The fraction of the wealth invested in the risky asset in a constrained solution never exceeds the one in the unconstrained solution. Our findings may not be sufficient to advocate either VaR or ES as a better risk measure, but do shed some light on how to utilise VaR or ES as an efficient risk management tool.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the financial market and the basic model setup. Section 3 contains some background on the unconstrained non-concave maximization problem which is used later as the benchmark case. Section 4 provides the optimal solution under a VaR-or an ES-constraint, respectively. Section 5 establishes the equivalence result when L ≤ D T , and shows that the two risk constraints are not equivalent when L > D T . Section 6 computes the optimal trading strategies with a CRRA utility function and analyses the properties of the optimal strategies analytically and numerically. The last section concludes. Some of the technical proofs are provided in the appendix.
The Model

The financial market
Assume that we work in a complete financial market in continuous time without transaction costs that contains one traded risk free asset S 0 (the bank account) and m traded risky assets denoted by the stochastic processes S = (S 1 , · · · , S m ) . 1 We fix a probability space (Ω, F, P ) equipped with an m-dimensional standard Brownian motion W , where F = (F t ) t∈ [o,T ] is the augmented filtration of W and T is the finite time horizon. Denote by Q the unique local martingale measure in the complete financial market and define by ξ T := S 0 (0)dQ S 0 (T )dP the state price density process. Throughout the paper we assume that ξ T is atom-less. Here ξ T is the Arrow-Debreu value per probability unit of a security which pays out 1$ at time T if scenario ω happens, and 0 else. As this value is high in a recession and low in prosperous time, ξ T (ω) has the property of directly reflecting the overall state of the economy. Therefore, the functional relationship between the optimal wealth and ξ T will be used as an interpretation of some of the results.
The financial institution endowed with x 0 chooses an investment strategy that we describe in terms of the fraction π i (t) of the total wealth invested in the ith risky asset at time t. The remaining wealth is invested in the risk free asset to guarantee the strategy to be self-financing. We assume that π(t) = (π 1 (t), · · · , π m (t)) is adaptive with respect to the filtration F = (F) t∈[0,T ] and the wealth process related to a strategy π(t) starting with an initial wealth x 0 is then given by
In a complete financial market, choosing a self-financing trading strategy π is equivalent to choosing a terminal wealth X π T which can be financed by X 0 . The set of attainable terminal wealth is defined by
From now on we omit the dependence of X T on π.
The model setup with a VaR-or an ES-constraint
In this section, we introduce the model setup with a VaR-or an ES-constraint. We consider a financial institution operating on [0, T ], T < ∞. At time 0, the company receives an initial contribution E 0 from the equity holders, and an amount D 0 from the debt holders. Consequently, the initial asset value of the company is given by
At the investment maturity, the liability holders receive a deterministic terminal payoff
T 0 rsds , g s denotes the deterministic yield of the debt, and r s denotes the deterministic spot interest rate. Note that if D T ≤ D 0 e T 0 rsds , the debt holders are better off by investing the money D 0 fully in a risk free asset. The payoff to the equity holders can be determined residually by
The financial institution on behalf of its equity holders invests the total proceedings x 0 in a diversified portfolio of the risky and the risk free assets as defined in Section 2.1. Further, we denote the equity holders' utility function by U and assume that the utility function is defined on the non-negative real line, strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously differentiable and satisfies the usual Inada and asymptotic elasticity (AE) conditions,
In addition, we assume U (0) = 0.
Remark 1. If U (0) ∈ (−∞, ∞), we know that adding a constant to the utility function will not change the essence of the optimization problem. If U (0) = −∞, one may see from the later proof that the optimal solution is to invest more than the debt level in any state. In this model, we allow the company to default and therefore exclude the case U (0) = −∞. Figure 1 is an illustrative example for the utility function of the equity holders, where the utility level equals zero when the wealth level is below the debt level.
The optimal asset allocation problem of the financial institution acting on behalf of its equity holders under an ES or a VaR regulatory constraint can be described as follows in Problems 1 and 2.
Problem 1. The ES-constrained optimization problem is defined as
where L is the given regulatory threshold and is chosen as a percentage of the initial wealth.
In addition, 1 is the indicator function, i.e., 1 A is 1 if A occurs and 0 otherwise.
Problem 2. The VaR-constrained optimization problem is defined as
The VaR-constraint is interpreted as a requirement that the terminal wealth is beyond the regulatory threshold L with a confidence level 1 − α, i.e., P (X T ≥ L) ≥ 1 − α. 3 Similarly, the 2 Note that throughout the paper the expectation is taken under P . 3 For example, Solvency II requires an insurance company to hold enough solvency capital such that it can meet its obligations to its policyholders with a confidence level of 99.5% (i.e., α = 0.005) over a 12-month period.
ES constraint is interpreted as a limitation on the average of the severe losses given that the terminal wealth is already below the regulatory VaR-threshold, i.e., E[ξ T (L − X T )1 X T <L ] ≤ . 4
Background on the non-concave optimization problem
In this section we will introduce some background regarding the general non-concave optimization problem. Then, we will provide the solution to the unconstrained case in our model as the benchmark solution.
Preliminaries
In solving the non-concave optimization problem, the technique commonly used is the concavification of the utility function. We summarize some important facts in the unconstrained non-concave optimization problem in the following lemma. 
ii) Denote by x * the maximizer of the concave envelope. If x * exists, x * takes value in the set
This Lemma follows from Theorem 4.1, Theorem 5.1, and Proposition 5.4 in Reichlin [2011] . We can see that the unconstrained non-concave optimization problem can be transferred to a concave optimization problem and solved using Lemma 3.1. However, this is not sufficient to solve the non-concave optimization problem with additional constraints. In our analysis, we will use the static Lagrangian to solve the constrained non-concave optimization problem. Below we first recall the concept of a conjugate function and then give some of its properties in our setting.
Definition 3.1. For a fixed and positive d, consider a concave utility function U (x − d) defined on (d, ∞) which satisfies the Inada and AE condition. For a given positive λ, we define the conjugate function c(y) := sup
where I is the inverse function of the first derivative of U and y > 0.
4 Expected Shortfall is used in the Swiss Solvency Test as a standard internal model. Furthermore, some researchers are suggesting to replace 99% VaR requirement in Basel III with a 97.5% ES requirement, see Embrechts et al. [2014] .
ii) Defining a new conjugate function c n (y) := sup
d)x(y) = U (I(λy))−λyI(λy)+λyd, c n (y) decreases on (0, U (d)/λ), increases on (U (d)/λ, ∞) and hence has the minimum value U (d).
iii) For each positive and fixed d, there exists ad such that U Note that U (x − d) − xλy represents a part of the static Lagrangian we employ to solve the optimization problem. The conjugate function describes the least upper hyperplane of this static Lagrangian. The third statement introduces the concept of the tangent point. We can see that the tangent pointd does not depend on λ and y. More interestingly, the conjugate function attains 0 at the tangent point. Due to the monotonicity of the conjugate function given in the first statement, we can determine whether the conjugate of the Lagrangian is positive or negative with a given y. In addition, we can construct the concave envelope with the tangent point, see Figure 2 below. Statement iv) defines a more complex conjugate function and introduces the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a zero root. We will see later that this function is useful to solve the ES-constrained problem.
We provide the proof of Lemma 3.2 in the appendix. 
The benchmark solution
The general unconstrained non-concave optimization problem has been considered for example by Carpenter [2000] and Reichlin [2011] . Hence, we provide the solution to the unconstrained problem in our model without proof. We consider the unconstrained solution as the benchmark solution in order to highlight the effect of the additional constraint.
Problem 3. The unconstrained optimization problem
Throughout the reminder of the paper we assume that for any λ
The benchmark solution is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. The optimal solution to Problem 3 is given by
The optimal terminal wealth in the benchmark case. This figure plots the optimal terminal wealth in the benchmark case. The basic parameters are chosen according to Table 1 in Section 5. Figure 3 depicts the optimal terminal wealth as a function of the state price density in the benchmark case. Figure 3 shows the most distinctive property of the terminal wealth in the nonconcave optimization problem, namely, the "all-or-nothing" shape. The reason for this shape is that the objective is to maximize the expected utility of an option-type payoff. Hence, the company is motivated to give up the region where the option is out of money in order to save resources to invest more in the region where the option is in the money to gain more potential upward benefits.
Non-concave optimization under an ES-or a VaR-constraint
In this section we solve the non-concave optimization problem with an ES-or a VaR-constraint, respectively. Theoretically, the given regulatory threshold L could either be smaller, bigger than or equal to the debt level D T . We will discuss all these cases separately.
The non-concave optimization under an ES-constraint
We firstly consider the ES-constrained optimization problem in this section, namely,
The solution to Problem 1 is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. The optimal solution to Problem 1 is:
Proof. We know that when the initial wealth is large enough (x 0 ≥ x 1 0 ) the optimal solution (4.3) coincides with the benchmark solution.
In the following we consider the case x min 0 ≤ x 0 < x 1 0 . We use the point-wise Lagrangian technique to prove this theorem. First, we show that (4.1) and (4.2) are the argmax of the corresponding static Lagrangian. Due to Lemma A.1 we can choose two Lagrangian multipliers to satisfy the budget constraint and the ES-constraint jointly. The static Lagrangian is
The Lagrangian is a function with two parts. The first part attains its maximum at I(λ ξ T )+D T . The second part is a negative affine function and obtains its maximum values at 0 or at the
is the local maximizer of the second part. Moreover, we can see that
Lemma 3.2 gives the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the zero root of (4.4).
In addition, when L ≤ D T , we have that
In particular, when λ 2 tends to 0, (4.4) uniformly converges to max
(whose zero root is ξ D T ) on each compact set, and thus the zero root of (4.4) converges to ξ D T . When λ 2 tends to λ , (4.4) uniformly converges to max
whose zero root is ξ L ), and the zero root of (4.4) converges to ξ L . Note that if x 0 ≥ x 1 0 , (4.3) is the optimal solution meaning that
is chosen such thatξ is the zero root of (4.4). Thus, we proved that (4.1) is the argmax of the static Lagrangian.
In the caseξ > ξ L , we set λ 2 = λ . Then, the affine part of the Lagrangian is constant on X T < L. This means that both L and 0 can be the local maximizer in the affine part. Moreover,
(4.5)
We know from Lemma 3.2 that (4.5) has a unique zero root which is denoted by ξ L . Hence, (4.2) is the argmax of the Lagrangian. Now we show that Theorem 4.1 is the optimal solution. Suppose there exists another feasible solution Y T . Consider
(4.7)
The inequality (4.6) holds because the optimal solution satisfies both constraints with equality. The last inequality (4.7) is due to the fact that the optimal solution is the argmax of the static Lagrangian. The proof is complete.
The case L > D T
In this case, the optimal solution to Problem 1 is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. The optimal solution to Problem 1 is:
Proof. We know that when x 0 is large enough (L > D T and x 0 ≥ x 2 0 or D T < L ≤ D T and x 0 ≥ x 3 0 ) the optimal solution (4.11) coincides with the benchmark solution. In the following we consider the case when the optimal solution does not coincide with the benchmark solution.
By Lemma A.1 we can choose two Lagrangian multipliers λ and λ 2 to satisfy two constraints jointly. The static Lagrangian is
We first prove that the solutions given by Theorem 4.2 are the argmax of Lagrangian in the respective cases.
The Lagrangian has four possible local maximizers: I(λ ξ T ) + D T on the first part, I((λ − λ 2 )ξ T ) + D T or the jump point L on the second part, 0 on the third part.
If ξ T < ξ we have that I(λ ξ T ) + D T > L, and the Lagrangian increases continuously from D T to I(λ ξ T ) + D T except possibly at L and decreases from then on. If ξ T ≥ξ, we have that I((λ −λ 2 )ξ T )+D T < L. The Lagrangian increases continuously from D T to I((λ −λ 2 )ξ T )+D T and decreases from then on except possibly at the jump point L.
By Lemma 3.2 we know that on ξ T < ξ ,
and on ξ T ≥ξ we have that
If ξ ≤ ξ T <ξ, we have that I(λ ξ T ) + D T ≤ L < I((λ − λ 2 )ξ T ) + D T , and the Lagrangian increases from D T to the jump point L and decreases from then on. Hence, L is the maximizer.
Therefore, the maximizer X T of the Lagrangian defined on X T > D T is
Next, we only need to compare the maximum given by (4.12) with φ(0) in different regions to determine the global maximizer. On ξ T < ξ , we have that
Lemma 3.2 provides the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the zero root of (4.13). Denoting the zero root as ξ 1 and we have that
In any other case, 0 is the global maximizer.
For the sake of clarity, we formulate a table of all the important values of ξ T .
The utility function is concave on x > D T . Assuming L > D T we have that ξ 1 > ξ D T > ξ ,
(4.8) is the argmax of the Lagrangian in this case.
If L ≤ D T , we have that ξ D T <ξ. Hence, {ξ T >ξ} {ξ T < ξ D T } = ∅, and then I((λ − λ 2 )ξ T ) + D T cannot be the maximizer.
In addition, we know that ξ 1 > ξ 2 holds because
Ifξ < ξ , λ 2 is chosen such that ξ 1 =ξ . Ifξ ≥ ξ , λ 2 is chosen such that ξ 2 =ξ . We have proved that (4.9) and (4.10) are the argmax of the Lagrangian, respectively. Now we prove that Theorem 4.2 is the optimal solution. Suppose there exists another feasible solution Y T . Then we have
(4.15)
We know that (4.14) holds because the optimal solution satisfies both constraints with equalities. The inequality (4.15) holds due to the fact that the optimal solution is the argmax of the static Lagrangian. The proof is complete.
Non-concave optimization under a VaR constraint
With the martingale approach, the problem with a VaR constraint is
The threshold L could be smaller than or equal to the debt level (L ≤ D T ), or greater than the debt level (L > D T ). We discuss these cases, respectively.
The case L ≤ D T
The solution to Problem 2 is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3. The optimal solution to Problem 2 is:
Proof. We know that when the initial wealth is large enough (x 0 ≥ x 4 0 ) the optimal solution (4.18) coincides with the benchmark solution . In the following we focus on the case when x min 0 ≤ x 0 < x 4 0 . We use the point-wise static Lagrangian technique. We first show that (4.16) and (4.17) are the argmax of the static Lagrangian in different cases. By Lemma A.1 we use two positive Lagrangian multipliers λ α and λ 2 to capture the initial wealth constraint and the VaR constraint, respectively. Case 1: ξ L ≥ξ α In this case, we want to show the argmax of the static Lagrangian is (4.16). The static Lagrangian is
Note that if x 0 ≥ x 4 0 , (4.18) is the optimal solution meaning that
. This further implies ξ D T ≥ξ α . Therefore,ξ α > ξ D T when x 0 < x 4 0 , and hence λ 2 is positive by Lemma 3.2. The first part of the Lagrangian attains its maximum U (I(λ α ξ T )) − λ α ξ T I(λ α ξ T ) − λ α ξ T D T at I(λ α ξ T ) + D T . The second part may attain its maximum value − λ 2 at 0 or −λ α ξ T L at the jump point L.
We search the global maximum of the Lagrangian through comparing the local maximums. We first compare φ(I(λ α ξ T ) + D T ) and φ(L). We have that
(4.19)
By Lemma 3.2, (4.19) has a unique zero root which is obtained by
in the region ξ T < ξ L as Lemma 3.2 gives that the conjugate function is a decreasing function of ξ T .
In addition, we have that
(4.20)
From Lemma 3.2, we know that (4.20) is positive in the region ξ T <ξ α and negative otherwise .
We only need to compare φ(0) and φ(L) in the region ξ T >ξ α . We have that
The last inequality holds because of Lemma 3.2 andξ α < ξ L . Thus, we have proved that (4.16) is the global maximizer in this case. Case 2: ξ L <ξ α In this case, we want to show that the argmax of the static Lagrangian is (4.17).
The static Lagrangian is
where λ 2 = λ αξα L. Again the first part attains its maximum U (I(λ α ξ T )) − λ α ξ T I(λ α ξ T ) − λ α ξ T D T at I(λ α ξ T ) + D T . The second part may attain its maximum value − λ 2 at 0 or −λ α ξ T L at the jump point L.
We know from (4.19) that φ( Therefore, (4.17) is the global maximizer of the static Lagrangian. Now we show that Theorem 4.3 indeed gives the optimal solution. Suppose there exists another feasible solution Y T . We have that
Therefore, Theorem 4.3 is proved.
Hence, this case is naturally nested in the case ξ L >ξ α .
The case L > D T
The following theorem contains the optimal solution in this case.
Theorem 4.4. The optimal solution to Problem 2 is given by:
Proof. We know that when the initial wealth is large enough (x 0 > x 5 0 ) the optimal solution (4.23) coincides with the benchmark solution. In the following we consider the case when x min 0 ≤ x 0 < x 5 0 . We first prove that (4.21) and (4.22) are the argmax of the Lagrangian respectively. By Lemma A.1 we can choose two positive Lagrangian multipliers λ α and λ 2 to satisfy the initial wealth constraint and the VaR constraint jointly.
The static Lagrangian is,
. λ 2 is non-negative by the third statement in Lemma 3.2.
The first part of the static Lagrangian obtains its local maximums φ(I(λ α ξ T ) + D T ) at I(λ α ξ T ) + D T or φ(L) at the jump point L. The second part obtains its local maximum φ(0) at 0 since it is a negative affine function. If ξ T < ξ α , we know from Lemma 3.2 that
In addition, since ξ α <ξ α < ξ D T we have that
Hence, in this region I(λ α ξ T ) + D T is the global maximizer. If ξ T > ξ α , then on ξ α < ξ T <ξ α we have that
Hence, L is the global maximizer on ξ α < ξ T <ξ α .
In addition, φ( Thus, (4.21) is the argmax of the static Lagrangian in Case 1.
λ 2 is non-negative because the utility function is always dominated by the tangent line which intersects the origin and the corresponding tangent point. Therefore, we have U
The static Lagrangian can attain its local maximums at I(λ α ξ T ) + D T , or at L or 0. We compare the differences of the local maximum values to locate the global maximizer.
We
Thus, we have proved that (4.22) is the argmax of the Lagrangian.
Suppose there is another feasible solution Y T which satisfies the budget constraint and the VaR constraint. We have that
Equivalence between an ES-and a VaR-constraint
In the previous section, we obtain the optimal solution to a non-concave utility maximization problem with an additional ES-or VaR-constraint. The non-concavity of the problem stems from the non-linear payoff structure of the equity holders in our consideration. We can see that the debt level as the strike price of the option-type payoff has a significant role in determining the structure of the solution. Note that if L ≤ D T , the solutions under a VaR-or an ES-constraint have exactly the same form. This implies that we are able to establish an equivalent VaR-(ES-) constraint with a given ES-(VaR-) constraint such that the optimal terminal wealth under these two constrained problems are identical assuming the regulatory threshold L is set at, or below the debt level D T .
Corollary 5.1. Assume L ≤ D T in the optimization Problems 1 and 2: i) For each given α, there exists one (α) such that X V aR T = X ES T .
ii) For each given α, there exists one (α) such that π V aR = π ES , where π V aR and π ES denote the optimal trading strategy, respectively.
Proof. Assuming L ≤ D T , Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.3 give the solutions to Problem 1 and Problem 2, respectively. The two-region solution in Theorem 4.1 is
The two-region solution in Theorem 4.3 is
Clearly, the two solutions are identical ifξ α =ξ and λ α = λ , whereξ α is defined through P (ξ T >ξ α ) = α andξ is defined through E[ξ T L1 ξ T >ξ ] = . Therefore, for each given α, we first calculateξ α and then set (α) := E[ξ T L1 ξ T >ξα ]. With the same initial wealth x 0 , we must have λ α = λ . Therefore, for each α, there exists one unique (α) such that X V aR T = X ES T . The three-region solution in Theorem 4.1 is
and the three-region solution in Theorem 4.3 is
ξ α andξ are defined in the same way as in the case of the two-region solution. ξ L is defined as U ( L−(D T −L))/λ α and ξ L is defined through U ( L−(D T −L))/λ . We first calculateξ α and chooseξ such thatξ (α) =ξ α . With the same initial wealth x 0 , we know that λ α = λ , which implies that ξ L = ξ L . Hence, for each given α, there exists one (α) such that X V aR T = X ES T . As the financial market is complete, every contingent claim can be perfectly replicated with a unique self-financing portfolio. Therefore, we obtain that for each given α, there is one (α) such that π V aR = π ES .
In the following, we give an example to show how to specifically compute the equivalent significance levels between VaR and ES. For simplicity, we consider a complete market with only one risky asset and one risk free asset, a constant risk free rate r and a constant market price of risk θ. The dynamic of the unique state price density ξ t is assumed to be dξ t = −rξ t dt − θξ t dW t , ξ 0 = 1, where W t is the one-dimensional standard Brownian motion. Therefore, we have that ξ T = exp(−(r+0.5θ 2 )T −θW T ) and that ξ T ∼ LN (−(r+0.5θ 2 )T, θ 2 T ). For a given α, P (ξ T >ξ α ) = α is equivalent to
Hence,ξ α = exp(Φ −1 1−α √ T θ − (r + 0.5θ 2 )T ), where Φ −1 1−α is the quantile of a standard normal distribution at 1 − α.
Next, we calculate the corresponding (α). We have that
By Corollary 5.1, we know that with a given α and the corresponding (α), Problem 1 and Problem 2 have the same solution.
We establish the equivalence according to the following procedure:
(a) We first obtainξ α through P (ξ T >ξ α ) = α. 5 (b) Then we calculate the corresponding (α) by
In other words, if we choose (α) as determined in (b), we obtainξ =ξ α .
We consider a Black Scholes market with constant parameters and a power utility function. Note that the market price of risk is θ = (µ − r)/σ.
σ T γ 100 4.80 100.88 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.2 1 0.5 Table 1 : The basic parameters in the two-asset Black Scholes market where µ is the drift and σ is the volatility of the risky asset. We consider the power utility function:
The following table contains some significance levels for VaR-and ES-constraint leading to the same portfolio choice in the Black Scholes market. In the most extreme case, the portfolio insurance (α = 0) is equivalent to = 0.
VaR (α) ES (% of initial wealth: /x 0 ) 0.5% 0.87% 1% 1.70% 5% 6.82% The above example illustrates how to obtain the equivalent ES-constraint with respect to a VaR-constraint such that the optimal terminal wealth stays unchanged assuming L ≤ D T . This procedure is similar when starting with a given ES-constraint. We are able to establish the equivalence because the optimal solution to a non-concave optimization problem always has a region where the terminal wealth is zero, which means that the expected loss in the worst financial states can be calculated explicitly. Therefore, the worst financial states in the ESconstrained case are solely determined by the given risk constraint as in the VaR-case. On the other hand, the expected loss in the worst financial states in the VaR-constrained case can also be computed in closed-form and is only determined by the risk constraint. Hence, a VaR-and an ES-constraint will lead to the same optimal investment strategy in a non-concave maximization problem given L ≤ D T . When the regulation is aimed at protecting the debt holders up to a certain level which is below the debt level (L ≤ D T ), the constraint only affects the optimal wealth in the region where the option-payoff is out of money. In other words, the financial institution adjusts the investment strategy only to satisfy the regulatory requirement. However, if the regulatory threshold is larger than the debt level (L > D T ), such a risk constraint will affect the distribution of the terminal wealth between the equity and debt holders even in some intermediate states where the option is not yet out of money. Especially in the case L > D T , the worst financial states in an ESconstrained problem are not only determined by the risk constraint but also by the initial wealth and the risk preference of the company. In particular, the equivalence result does not hold if L > D T .
Finally, we remark that due to the equivalence, both VaR and ES constraints control not only the probability but also the magnitude of the expected severe losses assuming L ≤ D T . Figure 4 displays the equivalence result. The dotted line denotes the case L = 0.9D T and the three-region solution. Further, we consider α = 0.005, = 0.87%x 0 . Other parameters are chosen according to Table 1 .
6 The optimal trading strategy with a CRRA utility function Heretofore, we solve the non-concave utility maximization problem with an ES-or a VaRconstraint in a complete market. We further establish the equivalence result between an ESand a VaR-constraint assuming L ≤ D T . In this section we provide the optimal trading strategy considering a CRRA utility function assuming L ≤ D T so that the regulation only aims at protecting the debt holders to a certain level. In addition, we use the benchmark strategy for comparison. The strategy with L > D T can be obtained in a similar way. For simplicity we consider a Black Scholes market with one risky asset which follows a geometric Brownian motion and one risk free asset. Assume that U (x) = x 1−γ 1−γ , r t = r, and that the drift µ, the volatility σ of the risky asset and the corresponding market price of risk θ := µ−r σ are all constant.
Proposition 6.1. The benchmark case (a) At t < T , the optimal benchmark wealth is given by
while the optimal benchmark strategy is given by
Proposition 6.3. The VaR-constrained case (a) At t < T , if ξ L ≥ξ α , the optimal VaR-constrained wealth is given by
while the optimal VaR-constrained strategy is given by
.
(b) If ξ L <ξ α , the optimal wealth is given by
(6.5)
The above propositions are shown in the appendix. Merton [1969] concludes that a CRRA utility maximizer will hold a constant fraction invested in the risky asset assuming the price of the asset follows a geometric Brownian motion. Equations (6.2), (6.3), (6.4) and (6.5) show that as time approaches the maturity, except for the worst financial states, the fraction of the wealth invested in the risky asset is proportional to the Merton constant but is always smaller than the Merton constant. On the other hand, we see from Figure 5 that in the worst financial states, the fraction of the wealth invested in the risky asset, which represents the volatility of the portfolio will converge to infinity. This is because in the worst financial states, the financial institution reduces the risky asset in the portfolio. The value of the whole portfolio is also decreasing (in ξ T ) and even faster than the value of the risky asset in the portfolio. Therefore, the fraction of the wealth invested in the risky asset tends to infinity in the worst financial states.
Moreover, the regulatory constraint not only affects the terminal wealth distribution but also controls the risky behaviour in between. Figure 6 shows that the benchmark wealth is higher than the constrained wealth before maturity only in very good economic states. The pre-horizon constrained wealth is larger than the benchmark wealth in most financial states and also in some of the worst financial states. Figure 7 depicts the relative risk exposure which is defined as the fraction of the wealth invested in the risky asset under the VaR-or the ES-constraint divided by the corresponding fraction in the benchmark case. We see that the fraction invested in the risky asset under the constraint converges to the unconstrained case in very good economic states and is substantially lower than the unconstrained case in most states. Furthermore, the fraction invested in the risky asset under the VaR-or ES-constraint will not exceed the fraction in the unconstrained case. This means that the regulatory constraint is useful to control the risky behavior of the financial institution for intermediate time points. Figure 5 : Optimal strategy at t = 0.5 under a VaR/an ES constraint. This figure plots the pre-horizon optimal strategy πt under a VaR/ES constraint. In the VaR case, we choose α = 0.005, and in the ES case we choose = 0.87%x 0 . Other parameters are fixed as in Table 1 . The horizontal line refers to the Merton constant (θ/σγ). Figure 6 : Optimal wealth at t = 0.5 under a VaR/ES constraint. This figure plots the pre-horizon optimal wealth under a VaR/an ES constraint. In the VaR case, we choose α = 0.005, and in the ES case we choose = 0.87%x 0 . Other parameters are fixed as in Table 1 Figure 7: The relative risk exposure under constraint with respect to the benchmark case at t = 0.5. This figure plots the relative risk exposure under a VaR/an ES constraint before maturity.
Conclusion
This paper studies the non-concave optimization with a VaR-or an ES-constraint. The nonconcavity in our setting is caused by the non-linear payoff to the investor (equity holders) in consideration. We obtain the distribution of the optimal wealth in closed form. We find that the optimal solution to a non-concave optimization problem always has a region where the terminal wealth is zero. Assuming that the regulation only aims to protect the liability holders up to a certain level (i.e., L ≤ D T ), this property enables us to easily calculate the expected loss measured by the regulatory threshold L in a VaR-solution in the sense that, E[Lξ T 1 ξ T >ξα ] is only determined by the regulatory threshold, and is independent of the financial institution's initial wealth or its risk preference. On the other hand, this also implies that the worst financial states in an ES-solution are only determined by the regulatory risk constraint. In particular, for both regulatory regimes the regulator does not need to know the utility function of the financial institution in order to control its tail behaviour. We establish the equivalence between a VaRand an ES-constraint for this case. Due to the equivalence, one constraint (VaR or ES) can control both the probability and the magnitude of the severe loss simultaneously. In addition, we explicitly calculate the corresponding optimal trading strategy for a CRRA utility function. We find that both VaR and ES constraint can restrict the financial institution's risky behavior effectively and the drawback of VaR-risk management disappears.
An interesting extension would be to analyse the non-concave optimization with multiple-VaR or multiple-ES constraints. Especially one could check whether the equivalence result still holds in such a dynamic setting. We will leave this for future research. 
In addition, c(y) is a continuous function and hence by the intermediate value theorem for each positive d, c(y) has a zero root. Hence, the third statement in Lemma 3.2 follows. We have ∂c * (y)/∂y = λ( λ 2 l λ − x) but the monotonicity of the function in y is not clear. We know that there is a one-to-one relationship between x and y in the conjugate function through x = I(λy) + d. We can see that when s < 0, λ( λ 2 l λ − x) = λ(s − I(λy)) < 0. Therefore, h is a decreasing function in y. We can write the conjugate function as U (I(λy)) − λy(I(λy) − s). It follows from the fourth statement in Lemma 3.2 that c * (y) has a unique zero root. Hence, we proved the fourth statement in Lemma 3.2.
It is ∂c n (y)/∂y = −λx, and x ≡ I(λy) − d holds for the conjugate function c n (y). Therefore, x > 0 if y < U (d)/λ and vice versa since I is a strictly decreasing function in y. Hence, c n (y) is a decreasing function in y when y < U (d)/λ and reverses to an increasing function in y when y > U (d)/λ. Thus, the conjugate function obtains its minimum conjugate at y = U (d)/λ which is U (d). We proved the second statement in Lemma 3.2.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6.1
Proof. The optimal terminal wealth is given by Theorem 3.1, which is X B T = (I(λ B ξ T ) + D T )1 ξ T <ξ D T . We know that ξ T X B T is a P-martingale. Hence, we have that
In addition, we know that ξ T ξt is log-normally distributed. To be more precise, ξ T ξ t = exp(−(r + θ 2 /2)(T − t) − θ(W T − W t )) ∼ LN (−(r + θ 2 /2)(T − t), θ 2 (T − t)).
We consider the power utility function x 1−γ 1−γ . Therefore, the inverse function of U is x −1/γ . Based on these observations, we have the following
∼ LN (−(r + θ 2 /2)(T − t)(1 − 1/γ), θ 2 (1 − 1/γ) 2 (T − t)).
Remark 4. For a log-normally distributed random variable Y ∼ LN (µ, σ 2 ), the expectation E[Y 1 a<Y <b ] is given by exp(µ + 1/2σ 2 )(Φ(j(b)) − Φ(j(a)), where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and j(x) = ln(x)−(µ+σ 2 ) σ .
Remark 5. In a two-asset Black Scholes model, the dynamic of the wealth process is given by dX t = (r + π t (µ − r))X t dt + π t σX t dW t , X 0 = x 0 .
Using Remark 3 and Remark 4, we obtain (6.1). Next, we apply Itô's lemma to obtain the optimal strategy. We omit the term corresponding to dt and just focus on the term with respect to dW t . We have then that dX B t = · · · dt + θ γ (λ B ξ t ) −1/γ exp(v(γ))Φ(x(ξ D T /ξ t , γ))
The following remark will be useful.
Proof. We first show that the budget Lagrangian multiplier in the first group of solutions exists. Take the two-region ES-constraint solution X ES (λ , ξ T ) = (I(λ ξ T ) + D T )1 ξ T <ξ in the case L ≤ D T for example. We will show that the map ϕ : λ E[ξ T X ES (λ , ξ T )] is a strictly decreasing, continuous and surjective function from (0, ∞) to (x min 0 , ∞). To see that the function ϕ is a strictly decreasing function is equivalent to showing that for all λ 1 > λ 2 > 0, ϕ(λ 1 ) < ϕ(λ 2 ). Define l(λ ) := (I(λ ξ T ) + D T )1 ξ T <ξ . Then we have ϕ(λ 1 ) = E[ξ T l(λ 1 )] and ϕ(λ 2 ) = E[ξ T l(λ 2 )]. We know that for ω ∈ Ω, I(λ ξ T ) + D T is a strictly decreasing function in λ almost surely. Hence, we conclude that l(λ 1 ) ≤ l(λ 2 ) and P (l(λ 1 ) < l(λ 2 )) > 0 as long as {ξ T <ξ } is not an empty set. Further, we have ϕ(λ 1 ) = E[ξ T l(λ 1 )] < E[ξ T l(λ 2 )] = ϕ(λ 2 ). Thus, ϕ is a strictly decreasing function.
It is easy to see that l(·) is a continuous function except for countable many points. Therefore, ϕ is a continuous function in λ .
In addition, if λ tends to ∞ then ϕ(λ ) tends to x min 0 and if λ tends to zero then ϕ tends to ∞. Therefore, ϕ is a strictly decreasing, continuous and surjective function from (0, ∞) to (x min 0 , ∞). Hence, for each fixed x 0 ≥ x min 0 , there exists a unique λ satisfying the budget constraint with an equality.
From equation (4.4), we choose λ 2 = −(U (I(λ ξ ))−I(λ ξ )λ ξ −λ ξ D T ) ξ L such that the ES-constraint is binding.
The other cases in the first group can be proved with similar arguments. Next we prove that two Lagrangian multipliers exist simultaneously such that the budget constraint and the ES constraint are binding simultaneously if L > D T .
In the first step of the proof we want to show that for a fixed λ and for 0 < λ 2 ≤ λ , the second constraint always holds.
If λ 2 tends to λ ,ξ := U (L − D T )/(λ − λ 2 ) converges to ∞. Hence, the optimal solution converges to
This implies that E[(L − X ES T )ξ T 1 X ES T <L ] − = − < 0, which obviously satisfies the ES constraint. If λ 2 = 0, the optimal solution converges to
which is the benchmark solution. Since x 0 < x 2 0 we have that E[(L − X ES T )ξ T 1 X ES T <L ] − > 0. For a fixed given λ , E[(L − X ES T )ξ T 1 X ES T <L ] − is a continuous and decreasing function in λ 2 and thus bijective. By the intermediate value theorem, the zero root of the function exists. We represent the zero root to be λ 2 (λ ), a function of λ .
